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In th~ Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
CLIFFORD G. FOLKMAN, Administrator
of the estate of Marie P. Folkman, deceased,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

ERNEST L. JENSEN,
Defendant and. .Appellant

·sTATEMENT OF ISSUES
Plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of his deceased wife, Marie P. Folkman, seeks to recover damages
for her alleged· wrongful death. She left surviving her,
in addition to her ·husband, two minor children, Larry,
age four, and Janet, age eleven months.
The defendant is the Chief of the Fire. Department
of Weber County, Utah.
The accident which caused the death of the deceased
occurred at the intersection of Grant and Patterson Avenues in Ogden City on the evening of July 23, 1948, at
about eight o'clock p. m., by reason of a collision hetwee~ a fire truck driven by defendant and an automobile driven by plaintiff, in which deceased was riding.
The case was tried to the Court, sitting without a
jury. The pleadings raised the following issues:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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A. "\\ras defendant guilty of negligence proximately causing the accident~
B. Was plaintiff himself guilty of contributory
negligence which caused or contributed to
causing said accident~
C. Was the deceased also guilty of contributory
negligenee which caused or contributed to
causing said accident.
The trial Court made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which may be summarized as follows:
A. That the defendant was guilty of negligence
in the operation of said fire truck a.nd that
such negligence w~as the proximate cause of
the accident and resulting death of deceased.
B. That. the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence in the operation of the car in which
the deceased was riding and that his contributory negligence proximately caused or
contributed to causing the accident.
C. That the deceased was not guilty of any contributory negligence.
Based upon these Findings and Conclusions, the
Court entered judgment denying plaintiff, as an heir of
deceased, any reeovery, but decreed that plaintiff should
recover, as representative of the two minor children and
for their exclusive benefit, the sum of Five Thousand
Dollars ( $5,000.00).
Defendant filed a motion for new trial, which said
motion was denied and overruled.
2.
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This appeal involves ouly t"·o questions:
1. Was the neglig-ence of the defendant the proximate cause of the accident and resulting~ death
of deceased 1
~.

In view of the Findings of Fact, as made by
the Court, \Yas the deceased herself g11ilty of
contributory neg·ligence as a matter of law
\vhich \vould bar any right of recovery for
the benefit of the two minor children~

3. As a necessary corollary thereto, should the

Court have _granted defendant's motion for
new trial'
STATE~IENT

OF FACTS

This being an action at law, and the trial Court
having found the defendant guilty of negligence and the
Court having also found the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence, we shall confine onr·selves _to a
statement of such facts deemed necessary to an understanding of the points raised on this appeal.
Grant Avenue is a through highway extending in
a Northerly and Southerly· ·direction through Ogden
City. Patterson ~venue .extends in a generally Easterly
and Westerly direction and intersects Grant Avenue.
At the point of ·intersection, stop signs were maintained
on Patterson Avenue, requiring East and West traffic
to stop before entering said intersection.
Weber County maintains a fire station on 12th
Street, a short distance West of Washington Boulevard.
It owned two fire trucks as a part of its fire fighting
3
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equipment. Each truck was equipped with· modern and
up-to-date sirens and red headlights. All of said equipment was in good working condition. The defendant
was and for a number of years had been the Fire Chief
of Weber County.
On the evening of July 23, 1948, at approximately
7 :45 p. m., a fire alarm was received at the station, advising that there was a fire burning some buildings at
3605 Adams Avenue (said buildings being located South
of and outside the corporate limits of Ogden City).
Both fire trucks im.media tely responded to the call. Defendant drove the largest truck (designated in the record
as No. 2) on lead. He was accompanied by an assistant who rode in the driver's seat on the right, whose
duty it was to sound the siren. The smaller truck,
designated No. 1, followed a short distance behind. It
was driven by a fellow fireman and similarly another
employee accompanied this driver, whose duty likewise
was to sound its sirens.
The trucks proceeded West on 12th Street to Wall
Avenue, then proceeded South to Patterson Avenue (located midway between 30th and 31st Streets), a distance
of 18lh blocks South of 12th Street. At this point Wall
Avenue was blocked by reason of road construction. 'rhe
fire trucks therefore turned East on Patterson, Truck
No.2 being approximately one-half block ahead of Truck
No. 1, and continued Easterly from Wall to Grant Avenue, a ~istance of two full blocks, each block being· 660
feet in length, excluding· the width of the streets. The
accident happened in the intersection somewhere near
the center.
4
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The trial l~ourt found that defendant \Vas responding to a fire alarm, that said truck \Vas an authorized
emergency vehicle as defined by the lav\rs of Utah, that
it was equipped \vith a la,yful siren, bell and red signal
lights, that said siren \Ya.s sounded during the entire
course of the trip from the fire station and that the ~ed
lights \Yere also lighted. While the Court made no
specific findings, the evidence disclosed and we assume
the Court inferentially found that the other fire truck
which was follo·w·ing a short distance behind likewise
sounded its siren continuously over the entire distance.
The Folkmans lived in Plain City, some miles to the
Northwest of Ogden. They intended to attend the rodeo
performance in the·city stadium on the evening of July
23rd. The performance opened at 8 :15 p. m. Plaintiff
drove the car, accompanied by his. wife, the deceased;
and their two small children. They came into Ogden
City on Wall Avenue. However, when they reached
21st Street plaintiff turned East to Grant (two blocks).
They had arranged to leave the baby ~th deceased's
parents, who resided at 32nd and Porter Avenue, while
they attended the rodeo performance. Therefore, instead of continuing on East to the rodeo, they turned
South and proceeded along Grant Avenue, intending to
continue to 32nd Street, thence East to Porter Avenue.
It is conceded, therefore, that as plaintiff proceeded
South on Grant A venue the two fire trucks were likewise proceeding South on Wall Avenue, two blocks to
the West. It was an ordinary warm summer evening.
The sun had not yet set. The deceased was sitting in

5
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the front seat on the West or right-hand side. The
front ear windows were down. Deceased's hearing and
eyesight were good. The same is true of the plaintiff.
When they reached a point some three blocks to the
.North of the intersection in question, they heard the
siren, which seemed to be to their North and West. They
proceeded a. short distance, and upon hearing the siren
a second time, they pulled toward the curb and stopped.
Thereafter they continued Southward along Grant Avenue, traveling at a speed of about twenty miles per hour.
Plaintiff testified his brakes were good and that
he could stop his car in a distance of approximately
ten feet. (Tr. 20). He testified tnat neither he nor his
wife heard the siren or saw the fire truck approaching
the intersection until a moment before the impact, and
the Court found that plaintiff did not see_ the truck
until a few seconds before the impact, when it was too
late to avoid the collision. The Court, however, made
no findings as to whether deceased saw the truck or
heard the siren before this time. It is inferentially assumed that the Court concluded that sh~ did not.
Witnesses called by both plaintiff and defendant
and who resided in the vicinity heard the siren before
and as the trucks proceeded East on Patterson. Some
of these witnesses were inside their residences. One
was in the back yard hanging out her clothes. One was
driving his c.ar Northward on Grant Avenue. Others
were sitting on their frorit porches. And from this
evidence the Court found that the siren was continuously
sounded from the time the truck left the station until
the impact.
6
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Plaintiff testified that the deceased gave no warn-·
ing of the approach of the fire truck as they proceeded
along Grant .Avenue and entered the intersection. The
evidence sho,ved that the house on the Northwest corner
of the intersection "~as back a considerable distanc.e
from Patterson and Grant, (See plaintif's Exhibit A.),
and that 'Yhile there ":ere some shade trees in front of
the house, they did not interfere with the view and the
Court expressly found that each driver had an unobstructed view of the other for a distance of 150 feet hack of
the intersection line.
As before noted, the cars collided in the vicinity of
the center of the intersection. The fire truck came to
a stop at or near the Southeast corner. As a result
of the collision, Marie P. Folkman received fatal inJUries.
The trial Court concluded from the evidence that
the defendant was guilty of negligence in the operatio
hat the plaintiff himself 'vas
ilt ·of contributor
of said truck.
e rial Court also found and conclude
neg 1gence, an he also found t at plaintiffs' negligence
could not be imputed to the deceased.
The trial Court further found that at the time of
the accident the deceased was holding· the baby in her
arms ''and that her attention was fully occupied by the
children." We can find no evidence in this record to
support this so-called Finding, which is more in the,
nature of a conclusion apparently deduced by the Court
in an attempt to explain deceased's conduct.
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The Court further found that deceased did not know
''nor by the exercise of reasonable care and caution could
she or should she have known of the approach of said
emergency vehicle by reason of the sounding of the said
siren or by the presence of the red lights on the front of
the vehicle.''
It is our contention that this is not a Finding of
Fact but is also in the nature of a Conclusion \Vhich is
contrary to and can find no support from the evidence
and the Findings made by the Court as to the facts.
The·se matters will be discussed more in detail hereafter.
STATEMENT OF ERRORS
Appellant relies upon the following errors committed by the trial Court for a reversal of the judgment of
the Court below:
1. (A) The Court erred in making and entering
that part of Finding No. 12 as follows:
''and that at said time and place her attention was fully occupied by the child in
her arms and her other four-year-old child
in the rear seat.''
(B) Also the following portion of Finding No.
12: "That said 1\ia.rie P. Folkman did not
know nor by the exercise of reasonable
care and caution could she or should she
have known of the approach of said emergency vehicle by reason of the sounding
of said siren or by the presence of the red
signal lights on the front of said vehicle.''
8
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1
( (

)

.L\.l~o

the following· portion of Finding No.
12 : ''That the collision and accident hereinbefore referred to \vas not through any
faul\t, uegligoe~c~ Oil' \vi.lful misconduct
on the part of said Niarie P. Folkman, nor
\Vas she guilty of any contributory negligence in any way.''

(D) Als.o the follo\ving portion of Finding No.

12 : '' S·aid Marie P. Folkman did, however, as soon as she saw the approaching
vehicle a moment or two before the accident, warn the said Clifford G. Folkman
of the approach thereof, at which tiine it
was too late to avoid a collision.''

. .

Findings (A) and (D) are not supported by ,
any evidence in the case. They partake of inferences or conclusions erroneously deduced by
the trial Court from the evidence and infer- \
ences logically deducible therefrom, and are inconsistent with the Findingsof Fact made by
the Court. (B) and (C) are not Findings of
Fact at all, but merely inferences or conclusions erroneously deduced by the trial Court
and said conclusions or inferences. are inconsistent with the Findings· of Fact and the undisputed evidence.
2. The Court erred in entering Conclusions of
Law No. 1 and 2. The same are not supported
by the Findings and are against .law.
3. The Court err~d in entering judgment against
this defendant for the reason that it is not supported in the Findings of Fact or the evidenc.e,
but is contrary thereto and against law.
9
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4. The Court erred in not finding that the deceased, .Marie P. Folkman, was, as a matter
of law, guilty of contributory negligence which
caused or proximately contributed to causing
said accident and her resulting death.
5. The Court erred in denying and overruling defendant's motion for new trial.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1. AS HERETOFORE INDICATED, IT IS
OUR CONTENTION THAT FINDING NO.
12 IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS ABSOLUT.ELY INCONSISTENT WITH THE OTHER FINDINGS
MADE BY THE COURT WITH RESPECT
TO HOW THE ACCIDENT HAPPENED.
Furthermore, we contend that this so-called Finding
of Fact is not really a Finding of Fact at all, but partakes largely of inferences or deductions which the
Court erroneously deduced from the evidence and is
inconsistent therewith.
We further contend that there is no evidence whatsoever to support that part of Finding No. 12 (A) that
at the time of the accident the deceased's attention was
fully occupied by the child in her arms and her other
four-year-old child in the rear seat. We have searched
this record to find any evidence to sustain this conclusion. It seems to us that the Court. merely drew
this conclusion in an attempt to explain deceased's acts
or failure to act for her OW11 safety. We shall refer
further to these matters ill connection with our discussion under Point 2.

10
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POIN'r

~-

IX VIEW OF THE OTHER FINDINGS
~l.A.l)E BY 'fHE COURT UPON EITHER
DISPr~rrED QUESTIONS OF FACT OR
lTPON UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE, WE
t~ONTEND THAT THE DECEASED WAS
HERSELF GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE AND THAT SUCH CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGE·NCE CAUSED OR
CONTRIBUTED PROXIMATELY TO
THE CAUSING OF SAID ACCIDENT.

The Court found that the fire truck in question belonged to Weber County, that it was an emergency vehicle as defined by the laws of the state of Utah, that
it was equipped with a lawful siren, bell and red signal
lights, which were lighted, ·that at and preceding- the
collision it \vas responding to a fire alarm, that the
siren thereon was sounded c.ontinuously as. the fire truck
proceeded Easterly on Patterson Avenue, and that it
had been sounded during the eourse of its entire trip
from the fire station, a distance of more than twentytwo full blocks. That it was proceeding· Easterly on
-Patterson Avenue at a speed of about thirty-five miles
per hour. That the accident happened about eight p. m.
All the evidence was to the effect that it was not yet
dark.
T.he Court further found that deceased was. sitting
in the front seat of the car, to the right of her husband,
as they proceeded South on Grant Avenue; that they
·were traveling at a speed about twenty miles per hour.
The· evidence is undisputed that the brakes on plaintiff's car were in good condition and that he could have
stopped his car in about ten feet.

11
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The Court further found that the evemng was
warm, the weather clear, and the side front windows of
the ear were down, and the hearing and eyesight of the
deceased were normal. That when about three blocks
North of the point of collision the driver heard the
siren (the undispuated evidence is that they both heard
the srien) and that after they had pro~eeded another
block or two South on Grant Avenue he pulled toward
the curb and stopped, so that both plaintiff and deceased
. were put upon notice of the presence of an emergency
vehicle in the vicinity. Notwithstanding· this fact, plaintiff continued to drive along Grant Avenue, entering
the intersection near the same time as the fire truck,
and the two cars collided near the center of the intersection. The Court further found that plaintiff had
an unobstructed view of Patterson Avenue for a distance of 150 feet West of the intersection when he
reached a point 150 feet North of said intersection, and
inferentially, at least, found that such unobstructed view
continued from said point to the point of collision. At
least the evidence is without conflict on this point.
Then the Court found that plaintiff was himself
guilty of -contributory negligence in failing to use reasonable care and caution and in failing to keep a proper
lookout for the approach of the emergency vehicle as
he proceeded toward and subsequently entered said
intersection.
Notwithstanding the existence of all of these facts
and the undisputed fact that the plaintiff was herself
in a better position to see the approach of the fire
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truck and to hear the siren as the truck approached the
intersection, the Court found or concluded or inferred
that · by the exerrise of reasonable care and caution
deceased could not and should not have known of the
approach of said emerg-ency v-ehicle, notwit~standing the
continuous sounding of said siren, the red signal lights,
and that her vie\v was clear and unobstructed for a
distance of 150 feet before they entered the intersection.''
4

LAW
Appellant is undoubtedly bound by the Court's finding that the defendant was guilty of negligence, even ,
though we are disposed to disagree with the same. Plaintiff is likewise bound by the Court's finding that be
was guilty of contributory negligenc.e and that his contributory negligence contributed proximately to the
injuries. What is the situation with respect to the deceased·~
The question of the degree of care which a
guest in an automobile must exercise for his own safety
has been before this Court many times. We think the
following excerpt from the case of
Atwood vs. Utah Light and Railway Company,
44 Utah 366, 140 Pac. 137
is now recognized as the law of this jurisdiction:
"It no doubt is the law, as contended by appellant's counsel, that every occupant of a vehicle,
in which he is riding, must always exercise ordinary care for his own safety, and if, by the exercise of such care, he could avoid injury to himself, but fails to do so, he cannot recover, re-
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gardless of the fact that he had no control or
direction of the vehicle in which he was riding
at the time of the accident and injury, but as has
been well stated by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Howe vs. Minneapolis R. Co., 62 ~linn.
71, 64 NW 102, 30 LRA 684, 54 Am. St. Rep.
616, 'We think that it would hardly occur to a
man of ordinary prudence, when riding as a passenger with a competent driver who he had no
reason to suppose· was neglecting his duty, that
he was required, when approaching a railway
crossing, to· exercise the same degree of vigilance
in looking and listening for approaching trains
·that he would if he himself had the control and
management of the team.' This seems to us good
sense as well as good law. ' '
Many of the cases are collected and discussed in the
rec.ent case of
Earle vs. S. L. and Utah R.

Corp~,

109 Utah 111, 165 P. 2d 877,
wherein this Court, after quoting the above excerpt from
the Atwood case, continued as follows:
''The Court then went on to say that while he
need not exercise the same degree of vigilance
as the driver, the guest could not sit still without
protest and allow the driver to g·o forward into
a position of imminent peril. In conclusion the
Court held the driver's negligence not imputable
to the guest where it was shown that she had no
control over the vehicle and no reasonable apprehension of peril. Citing Lockhead vs. Jensen, 42
Utah 99, 129 P. 347. In Lawrence vs. Denver &
R. G. R. Company, 52 Utah 414, 174 P. 817, 820,
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it \YH s said: ·The only inference permissible from
the eYidence is that the \Yarnings and signals .
mentioned \Vere gi Yen. The alleg·ed failure of
plaintiff, Ann Bird, to hear one or more- of them,
their failure to observe the smoke issuing from
the engine, or to hear the rumble and noise of
the fast moving- train in time to have avoided
the accident, cannot, in the face of the undisputed
ec·i.deuce, be accouHted for or explained on any
theory other than that of indifference, inattenh~on, and lack of ordinary care a.nd caution on
their part. Each of them testified that he was
familiar with the crossing, having passed over
it many times. Furthermore, it is a well recognized rule that a steam railroad track in actual
use is a constant warning of danger, and its
presence is sufficient, as a matter of law, to put
a reasonably c.areful person approaching it on
notice of such danger and it is the duty of such
person.to look and listen before crossing it.' The
holding therein was that the guest, failing to see
the train, where a view vvas apparently unobstructed, and warning signals given, was guilty
of contributory ne·gligence as a matter of law.''
We shall not attempt to cite all the Utah cases
dealing with the subject as many of them have been cited
and referred to not only in the Earle case but other decisions. However we do desire to refer to one or two
other cases which we think pertinent.
Cowan vs. Salt Lake Railroad Company,
56 Utah 94, 189 Pac. 599.
In this case the Court makes observations concerning the
Lawrence case and points out that in that case the plaintiff (guest) sat in the front seat of the automobile and
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that he. therefore had the same if not a better oppor. tunty than the driver to keep a lookout for and to see
warning signals of an oncoming train and see its approach, and the duty imposed was that he was required
to make vigilant use of his senses and to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury.
Counsel will no doubt contend that these cases are
all r:ailroad eases and that a different duty devolves
upon a guest when approaching a railroad crossing than
under other circumstanc.es. We find nothing in these
cases which seems to bear out this contention. The duty
to exercise due care is always present. There are certain
facts inherent in railroad crossing cases not found in
other cases, but merely because the collision is between
an automobile and a railroad train at a public crossing·
makes no difference in measuring the duty of the g11est
to exercise reasonable care for his own safety. If there
are present other facts, .equally as cog-ent in respect to
giving adequate warning, there certainly is no reason
why a different standard of care could or should be
required.
Maybee vs. Maybee, 79· Utah 583,
11 P. 2d 972.
This case did not involve a railroad or public crossing.
The opinion, however, quotes from the Atwood case,
the Jackson vs. Transit Company case, and then summarizes as follow:
''Such cases (no reference to railroad crossings)
show that a guest or invitee in an automobile
having no control or direction of the manage~
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ment of it, is not held to the care required of
the opera tor and has a rig·ht to rely on the prudence, care and skillfulness of the operator. In
the absence of facts indicating an absense of such
qualities, if the guest or invitee knows that the
operator is incompetent or careless or u.nawa.re
of approaching daHger or is not tak·iffltg proper
precautions to avoid ·it, it again becomes the
duty of the guest or i.nvitee to caution or notify
the operator. So, too, if the guest or invitee sees
or kno,vs that the operator is operating. the auto
at an excessive, unla,vful or dangerous speed
or in ·tiolation of traffic rules and regulations
or other~v-ise is mismanag,ing or driving the auto
in a careless ma.nner, it again is the duty of the
invitee or guest to protest and ask the operator
to desist aud if the guest or invitee fails so to
do, he may be regarded as having consented to
or acquiesced in such violati1on or negligence of
the opera-tor rendering the guest or invitee himself personally gu.ilty of negligence."
It is also well-established that while one person may
have the right-of-way, this right is not absolute so as
to protect the defendant in all cases and violation of
the right-of-way does not relieve the other person from
negligence.
Section 57-7-140, Utah Code Annotated, provides:
''Emergency Vehicles.
(a) Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle, \vhen the driver is giving
audible signal by siren, exhaust whistle, or
bell, the driver of every other vehicle shall yield
the right-of-way and shall immediately drive to
a position parallel to, and as close as possible
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to, the right-hand edge or curb of the highway
clear of any interesction and shall. stop and remain~ in such position until the authorized emergency vehicle has passed, except when other,vise
directed by a police officer.
(b) This section shall not operate to relieve the
driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from
the duty to drive with due regard for the safety
of all persons using the highway.''
The deceased was in as good a position, or even
better, than the driver to see the approaching vehicle
as it came up Patterson Avenue, to hear the noise of
its approach, which all the witnesses testified was very
considerable, and certainly to hear· the siren, while they
were approaching the intersection. While it is impossible to put into the record the actual sound of a. fire
siren, yet this Court judicially knows that the eerie
and almost blood-curdling sounds emitted from a fire
engine is such as to give anyone notice of its immediate
approach. If it were· merely a queston of deceased's
failing to see a car approaching into the intersection,
such conduct might be explained or condoned, but ho"·
can one be oblivious to the approach of two fire trucks
which have traveled a distance of 22 blocks with their
sirens continuously sounding, especially when they were
proceeding· in the same direction on parallel streets only
two blocks apart. The fact that they heard the siren
and stopped two or three blocks to the North further
put them on notice to he on the lookout. Likewise deceased's failure to he.ar or see the approach of the fire
engine as it came up Patterson Av~nue for. two full
blocks is likewise beyond human understanding or com18
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prehension. Especially is this true when we next consider the finding of the trial Court that deceased had a
clear and unobstructed Yie\v do'vn Patterson Avenue
for a distance of 150 feet, when they 'vere 150 feet
North of the intersection, and it naturally follows that
as they approached nearer her view on Patterson lengthened proportionately.
The Court found that they were traveling at a rate
of speed of t\Yenty miles per hour; the fire truck at a
speed of thirty-fiYe miles per hour and the cars collided
near the center of the intersection; so that when the
fire truck was 150 feet West of the West line of the
intersection the car in \Yhich plaintiff \vas riding would
have to be approximately 100 feet North of the point of
contact. The plaintiff testified he could have stopped
his ear in ten feet. We therefore are confronted with
the situation where deceased sat by without giving the
driver any \Yarning or otherwise attempting to avoid a
collision, while they traveled for a distance of nearly
100 feet into the path of an oncoming fire truck with
its siren wide open and which indicated no intention on
the part of the driver to slow down as it approached the
intersection, and therefore gave ample warning of defendant's intent to go through, as defendant clearly
had the right to do, under the provisions of the above
quoted statute.
Quoting from the Montague case:
"It certainly taxes one's credulity to believe that
one riding in the front seat of an automobile with
every opportunity to see and hear what is going
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on around her neither heard the siren nor saw
the fire truck as they approached the intersection.''
But if such is the case, then as stated by this Court
in the Lawrence vs. D. & G. G. W. case cited supra, her
alleged ·failure to see and hear the approaching fire
truck in time to have avoided the accident cannot, in
the face of the undisputed evidence (and the Court's
findings) be aecounted ~or or explained on any theory
other than that of indifference, inattention, and lack
of ordinary care and caution on her own part. It must
be remembered, in this connection, that the plaintiff
testified that deceased gave no warning, and that if
she had h~ could have stopped before reaching the point
of collision.
The only logical explanation is that these parties
were anxious to get to the rodeo performance and took
the chanee of trying to beat the fire truck through the
intersection, because the car preceding them was doing
the same thing.
It is true that in ttte IDarle vs. S. L. and Utah R:
Corp. case this Court held that under the fact of that
case the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence
presented a question of fact for the jury. A reading
of that case convinced us that it was considered by this
Court to be a ''borderline'' case. However the facts
in the Earle case are clearly distinguishable. In that
case the following facts are to be noted:
A. The plaintiff's view of the approaching car
was obstructed by orchards, trees and vegetation
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gTo,ving- along the East side of the hig~h,vay.
In our ease the Court found that there was no such obstruction.
B. 4--\. question of fact w'as presented for the jury
as to \Yhether or not \varnings and signals of its
approach \Yas g·iven before the electric. car
reached the point where it entered upon the high~
\Yay, at 'vhic.h time, 'vhen the signal was admittedly given, the accident eould not have been
avoided.
In our case the trial Court found that such warning'S
were in fac.t given continuously from the time the fire
truck left the fire station and that the siren was sounded
continuously during the entire two blocks while it proceeded up Patterson Avenue and entered the intersection.
C. An electric car makes little or no noise, unlike a train, so that the only way one has of
knowing of its approach is by either seeing
the car or hearing the warning whistle.
In our case the continuous sounding of a siren is much
more clearly heard than a whistle of an electric train.
D. The question presented in the Earle case
was whether the plaintiff's knowledge that
they were about to c.ross a railroad track at a
public crossing was sufficient to put them on
notice to look out for an oncoming electric
car, even though its approach c.ould not be
heard.
In our case the actual knowledge of the· approach of the
firetruck was present and apparent, both to the senses
of the eye and the ear.
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We therefore contend that the ruling in the Earle
case does not control in this case, but that the arguments
and citations referred to therein amply support our
position.
That it is the duty of this Court to declare one
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of la"T
where no other reasonable inference is permissible can
no longer be doubted.
Conklin vs. Walsh, 193 P. 2d 437,
------------U tab .. _______ ---·
Hickok vs. Skinner, 190 P. 2d 514,
· ------------Utah ____________ _
l\fingus vs. Olsson, 201 P. 2d 495,

-----------~.ak-~ J.-.1 ~ p. 2-4, g 5 h
A~t contenas, therefore, that the conduct

of
the deceased, interpreted in the light of the evidence
and the findings of the trial Court on disputed questions
of fact, admit of no other conclusion except that deceased, as a matter of law, was guilty of contributory
negligence and that such ·contributory negligence on her
part contributed directly to the causing of this unfortunate accident, and that the so-called finding or
conclusion of the Court that she was not gt1ilty of such
· contributory negligence is not supported by the evidence
or the law applicable thereto, and that judgment in
fa.vor of plaintiff cannot be sustained.
POINT 3. IF DECEASED WAS NOT GUILTY O:B_,
CO.NTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, AS A
MATTER OF LAW, YET THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANT WAS
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NOT rrHE PROXIl\IATE CAUSE OF THE
ACCIDENT.
We base our c.ontention on this point by reaso·n of
the reasoning contained in the case of
Harratich vs. 0. S. L.,
70 Utah 552, 262 Pac. 100.

As previously noted, the fire truck was visible to
the deceased when it reached a distance of 150 feet
West of the West line of the intersection. If the truck
had not reached that point when the car in which decedent was riding had reached a point 150 feet North
of the intersection, yet the evidence is conclusive that
when their car reached a point 100 feet North of the
intersection the fire truck entered into full view. (The
fire truck traveled 1.75 feet while the car traveled 1
foot.) Applying the relative speeds of the two cars,
as found by the trial Court, when the fire truck came
into full view the car in which deceased wa.s riding was
approximately 100 feet North of the point of collision,
and, as a matter of fact, as plaintiff's car proceeded
South from the 150 feet, his and deceased view would
be lengthened beyond the point of 150 feet and the
fire truck would have been back about 262 feet when
plaintiff's car was 150 feet North of the intersection.
It is undisputed that plaintiff could have stopped
his car in a distance of ten feet and that he would have
stopped his car had the deceased warned him of the
approaching fire truck. Notwithstanding this fact, his
car proceeded for a distance of at least 100 feet or more
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while the oncoming fir·e· truck traveled at least 175 feet
or more to the point of contact, and during this entire
time the fire truck was visible to the eye and certainly
the warning sound of the siren was visible to the ear,
yet defendant made no effort to slow down the- fire
truck, clearly indicating an intent on his part not to
stop at the stop sign.
Upon the reasoning set forth in the Haaratieh case,
we contend that irrespective of the defendant's negligence in failing to slow down and yield the right-of-way
to the· plaintiff, yet defendant's negligence was not the
proximate cause of the collision but that the sole, immediate cause of the accident was the negligence of the
plaintiff.

POINT 4. FOR THE REASON-s HERETOFORE INDICATED, THE COURT SHOULD HAVE
GRANTED _DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL.
Respectfully submitted,
LeRoy B. Young
of Thatcher & Young
O.gde·n, U tab
Robert A. Burns,
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant.

24
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

